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The Mighty Myths of Kelo
By John R. Nolon
The press releases of
property rights activists and
the media’s rapid embrace
of their views have perpetuated several myths about the
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. New London.1 In
the immediate aftermath of
this myth making, the legislatures of several states have
adopted restrictions on the
use of eminent domain with
uncharacteristic speed. Wisely,
the New York State Legislature has been more cautious in
its reaction.
As it turns out, many of the eminent domain laws in
other states have nothing to do with New London’s program of area-wide redevelopment or the legal holding of
the Kelo case. In fact some will have the unintended consequence of crippling state and municipal efforts to direct
the redevelopment of inner-city neighborhoods, coastal
areas subject to inundation due to climate change, and
cities trying to rebuild after devastating natural disasters.

Myth #1: New London’s Objective Was Economic
Development
New London is a formally designated “distressed
city.” In Connecticut, a state in which there is a great
disparity between haves and have-nots, New London
houses mostly the latter. Its 5.5 square miles were carved
out of the affluent town of Waterford, which has a
property tax rate 40 percent lower than New London’s.
The city serves, as most older cities do, to house transit
facilities, hospitals, colleges, polluting industries, and
low- and moderate-income workers: all resources critical to its region’s well-being. New London’s poverty and
unemployment rates are well above the state’s average.
Because the city lost a naval base and most of its industrial jobs, its tax base declined and it has flirted with
municipal bankruptcy.
New London, after much public discussion and debate, adopted an area-wide redevelopment plan for one
of the few relatively low-density parcels left, next to the
shuttered naval facility and a state-funded public park.
The plan envisioned a small mixed-use, tourist-oriented
urban village, with public parking, a renovated marina
and river walk open to the public, and some restaurants
and shopping. These activities would generate 1,000 new
jobs, bring tax revenues to the fiscally strapped city, and
enable it to provide better services to its low- and moder-
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ate-income residents and workers and continued service
to the region beyond.
It would be startling news to generations of urban
policy makers that this New London program was designed to achieve “economic development.” Area-wide
redevelopment programs are a response to a tight knot of
despair in distressed cities like New London. These cities
were called places “from which men turn” by the unanimous U.S. Supreme Court in Berman v. Parker,2 which
upheld an area-wide urban renewal plan in the District
of Columbia over 50 years ago. Countless local, state,
and federal programs have struggled to restore inner-city
regional centers; to obtain the proper balance of housing,
industrial, and commercial facilities; and to increase their
attractiveness to persons of all incomes to make them
desirable places to live, work, shop, and enjoy life and its
urban amenities.

Myth #2: Berman v. Parker Made New Law
The Kelo Court based its decision on the Berman case
which upheld the constitutionality of condemning the
non-blighted property owned by the plaintiff in the interest of area-wide redevelopment of an inner-city neighborhood. It also sanctioned the lease or sale of condemned
land to private redevelopment companies whose projects
conform to the area-wide plan. According to the myth,
that Court confused the narrow concept of public use (for
which property may be condemned) with the broader
definition of public purpose (which justifies other government functions, such as land use regulations).
The Berman Court—all nine Justices—thought that
condemnation could be employed to accomplish any objective for which sovereign power can be exercised when
it permitted condemnation of private land for a “public
use.”3 The myth claims that “public use” is limited to a
narrower range of objectives: takings for public works
projects, public utility projects, or projects that the public
at large will actually be able to use, such as a park. There
is no evidence of any discussion of this distinction among
the Constitution’s framers; in fact, the Court had assumed
the opposite for over 50 years before the Berman decision
was handed down.
In 1893, Congress authorized the War Department to
condemn private property in and around the Gettysburg
battlefield. The Gettysburg Electric Railway Company
challenged this act, arguing that the preservation of the
lines of battle by preventing the completion of its rail
line was not a public use as that term is used in the Fifth
Amendment. In U.S. v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., the
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Court addressed this question: whether “the use to which
the petitioner desires to put the land . . . is of that kind of
public use for which the government of the United States
is authorized to condemn land.”4
The Court held that the government “has authority to
do so whenever it is necessary or appropriate to use the
land in the execution of any of the powers granted to it
by the constitution. . . . [W]hen the legislature has declared the use or purpose to be a public one, its judgment
will be respected by the courts. . . .”5 As if anticipating
future questions, the Court added, “The power to condemn for this purpose need not be plainly and unmistakably deduced from any one of the particularly specified
powers. Any number of those powers may be grouped
together, and an inference from them all may be drawn
that the power claimed has been conferred.”6

Myth # 3: Condemned Land Cannot Be
Transferred to a Private Entity
What about the Berman court’s authorization of the
transfer of title to condemned land to the private sector for redevelopment—surely that was a newly minted
concept? To the contrary. That complaint was settled by
the Court in a 1906 opinion: Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold
Mining Co.7 In Strickley, an easement over the plaintiff’s
property was condemned and handed over to his neighbor, a private mining company. The complaint was that
this was done solely for private benefit and was not,
therefore, a public use under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The condemnation was done under a Utah
statute which asserted that the public welfare of the state
demanded that mining operations in the mountains have
access to rail lines in its valleys.
Justice Holmes wrote the opinion of the Court which
addressed the sole question of whether the Utah statute
is consistent with the constitutional prescriptions regarding the condemnation of property for a public use. His
response follows: “In the opinion of the state legislature
and the Supreme Court of Utah, the public welfare of that
State demands that aerial lines between the mines on its
mountain sides and the railways in the valleys below
should not be made impossible by the refusal of a private
owner to sell the right to cross his land. The Constitution
of the United States does not require us to say that they
are wrong.”8
For a more modern endorsement of taking private
property and transferring it to other private parties where
the larger public interest is clearly promoted, see Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto.9 There the Court upheld a provision
of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act which “took” the data submitted by private companies to support their applications for a permit to market
chemicals. It allowed the EPA to use their private data to
evaluate subsequent applications, so long as the later applicants paid just compensation for the data. The public

benefit is in the speedier entrance into the market of valuable chemical products.

Myth # 4: Every American Home and Shop Is
Vulnerable to a Taking
The petitioners in Kelo were represented by an advocacy litigation group that raised public awareness of the
fact that some public takings are abusive. It cited evidence
of condemnations of homes and shops of innocent owners
whose property was taken primarily to benefit a Walmart, a Ritz Hotel, or even Donald Trump. The specter of
corrupt, or misguided, local officials condemning title to
property of private owners primarily to benefit developers was on the mind of the Court in the Kelo decision. The
majority made it clear that “[s]uch a one-to-one transfer
of property, executed outside the confines of an integrated
development plan, is not presented in this case.”10
The background of the New London case illustrates
the extent of the government’s presence in typical areawide development planning. The state designated New
London an economically distressed city. Its area-wide
plan was supported by a $5 million state grant. The state
also provided a $10 million grant to establish Fort Trumbull park. The state authorized the city to establish the
New London Development Corporation, a quasi-public
body, which was then created by the city council to prepare the plan and implement it as the city’s agent. Such
public development corporations are created and governed by the state Municipal Development Statute which
authorizes the condemnation of land that cannot be
acquired voluntarily and without which the project cannot succeed. Each qualifying project is designated by the
state statute as “public use.” Under that statute, a detailed
public process must be followed including public input,
public hearings, and full transparency. The resulting plan
in New London was approved by the city council and
by the State of Connecticut. The New London Development Corporation eventually selected one developer out
of a group of applicants to which the land is to be leased,
not sold, remaining in public ownership. Finally, the city
agreed to install some of the needed infrastructure as a
contribution to the area-wide project’s success.
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion in Kelo,
discussed how courts handle one-to-one transfers. He
demonstrated that, using the rational basis test that all
police power actions must meet, courts can invalidate
such condemnations by finding that the public benefits
achieved by such a transfer are only incidental to the
benefits that will be conferred on the private parties. The
dissenters in Kelo disparaged Kennedy’s confidence in
the rational basis test as sufficient to ferret out privately
motivated takings by applying the “stupid staffer” test:
suggesting that only the most inept administrations could
fail to paper over a private deal and make it appear public in nature.
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The dissent was apparently unaware of numerous cases called to the Court’s attention in amici briefs
submitted in Kelo. In 99 Cents Only Store v. Lancaster
Redevelopment Agency, for example, a federal district court
in California invalidated the condemnation of a store to
accommodate the interest of an adjacent Costco’s expansion plans; it found that the redevelopment agency’s only
purpose “was to satisfy the private expansion demands
of Costco.”11 In Bailey v. Meyers, the state court held that
the taking of a brake shop for the construction of a hardware store to advance economic development lacked the
requisite public purpose.12 Donald Trump’s attempt to
get the Casino Reinvestment Development Authority in
New Jersey to condemn the parcels of a few landowners
who had refused to sell to expand his hotel and casino
was thwarted by the state court; it found that the Authority had given Trump a blank check regarding future
development on the site.13
Under state law, in fact, courts have invalidated
condemnations in Arizona, California, Georgia, Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, and Virginia.
In all these cases, there was no sustaining public presence of the type involved in all area-wide redevelopment
projects. In cases involving no more than a one-to-one
transfer of title between businesses, as a de facto matter,
the court can use the rational basis test to look closely at
whether the private benefit achieved is dominant and
the public benefit incidental. This enables state courts to
invalidate such condemnations, saving the homes of average Americans and the businesses of moms and pops,
dulling the edge of the hard-cutting rhetoric of those
alarmed by the majority’s decision in Kelo.

Myth # 5: Private Gain was the Motive for the
Condemnation in Kelo
Reactions to Kelo pointed out that developers often
drive public decisions to condemn private land. They
somehow convince public officials who stand for reelection frequently to exercise public authority primarily
for the developers’ private gain. In New London, there
was no developer on the scene during the entire twentymonth decision-making process. The New London Redevelopment Authority, a publicly created, not-for-profit
corporation, was authorized to purchase and condemn
land for the area-wide development project. Following
acquisition, it was authorized to advertise for private
redevelopers, select one, and lease the acquired land to
that developer.
Area-wide development projects, under state laws
that govern them, are subject to onerous, transparent,
and lengthy processes that provide all the details of the
project and invite public participation and extensive
debate. In New London, the public was asked what it
thought about the redevelopment project as the project
was debated, shaped, and decided over a period of near-
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ly two years. In New York, under the State Environmental
Quality Review Act, redevelopment projects generate
foot-high environmental impact statements that include
a hard look at their impact on community character and
neighborhood change, and contain lengthy chapters on
the economic and environmental consequences of the
project.
Public hearings, Uniform Land Use Review Process
proceedings in New York City, reviews of impact statements, open meeting laws, conflict-of-interest rules, and
a host of other legal protections ensure that the public
knows who is involved, how they were chosen, what the
proposed benefits are, and who will suffer. By the time
such projects are approved, this public process has mediated the claims of those whose properties are to be taken
and the public benefits of urban revitalization: jobs, housing, increased taxes, better services, and a more livable
community.

Myth # 6: State Legislation Limiting Eminent
Domain Is Clearly Beneficial to the Public
The many state legislative reforms that followed
Kelo’s discontents can be divided into two categories. The
first includes those that in effect needed procedural and
substantive reforms: longer notice to affected landowners, more public involvement, more transparency, better
area-wide planning, or clearer articulation of the public
benefits to be achieved. The second curtails the use of
eminent domain in one of several ways: they limit it to
public works, public access, or public utility projects;
allow it in blighted areas, but define blight narrowly; prohibit it for economic development; prohibit the transfer of
condemned land to private redevelopers; or some combination of these.
There are serious doubts about whether the consequences of this second category of reforms are beneficial.
If Connecticut statutes, for example, limited condemnation to public works projects or limited it to use in narrowly defined blighted areas, New London would have
had great difficulty carrying out an area-wide development project in aid of its revitalization.
Several projects in New York City would have been
frustrated if such laws had been adopted in New York.
In an amici curiae brief filed in Kelo, the Empire State
Development Corporation noted its success in transforming neighborhoods surrounding the New York Stock
Exchange, Seven World Trade Center, and in the 42nd
Street Redevelopment Area; it attributed its success, in
part, to using its authority to condemn private properties
and convey them to private development companies. The
Corporation’s brief notes that “despite private benefits,
the predominant economic and social benefits have accrued to the public.”14
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In Rosenthal & Rosenthal v. The New York State Urban
Development Corp., the Second Circuit affirmed a District
Court decision upholding the taking of the petitioners’ unblighted buildings which were needed for the
42nd Street Redevelopment Project.15 The District Court
found that the proposed taking was rationally related to
a conceivable public purpose. The Second Circuit noted
that “the power of eminent domain is a fundamental and
necessary attribute of sovereignty, superior to all private property rights.”16 It rested its decision on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision the previous year in Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff, concluding that “courts long
have recognized that the compensated taking of private
property for urban renewal or community redevelopment is not proscribed by the Constitution.”17 The U. S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Rosenthal in 1986.18
Various industrial companies, including several oil
refineries, challenged the City of Syracuse Industrial
Development Agency for condemning their properties
to further a waterfront redevelopment master plan for
an 800-acre area on the south shore of Onondaga Lake
known as “oil city.” Sun Company v. City of Syracuse IDA.19
The area was located next to several low-income neighborhoods in Syracuse where a disproportionately large
percentage of welfare recipients, jobless, and povertylevel households resided. This is a classic environmental justice context, but condemnation could be denied
under reform bills that define such projects as “economic
development’’ or that require the city or IDA to develop
the project itself, by prohibiting transfer of title or possession to a private redevelopment company. The New
York court in Sun Company found that the purpose of the
taking was to accomplish a proper use. The petitioners’
motion for leave to appeal was denied by the Court of
Appeals in 1997.20
Property rights advocates oppose condemnation because it victimizes limited-income homeowners. Consider
New Orleans, still trying to find the formula for redevelopment long after Katrina. In the absence of an area-wide
plan and effective means of implementing it, many lower-income homeowners do not have the financial wherewithal to repair or rebuild their homes. Many of them
work for $10 to 15 an hour. With this income, they can
afford a home costing around $70,000. In the lower Ninth
Ward, lower-income homeowners have existing debt,
face extremely high costs of repair, and must meet FEMA
flood plain elevation requirements which alone can cost
$30,000. The sum of these costs, in many cases, greatly
exceeds what they can afford even considering available
governmental subsidies, where they can be obtained. As
a result, many property owners have sold their properties
at 30 percent of pre-hurricane values.
Area-wide development in New Orleans can’t work
without the use of the power of eminent domain. Some
owners cannot be found. Some parcels have no record

owners. Some are slivers of land and not marketable,
others are in foreclosure, some are tied up in estates that
will never be resolved, others have multiple owners who
cannot agree on what to do, and some are owned by individuals who are incapacitated. Although the situation is
more dramatic, this confusion of titles is typical of conditions in many inner-city neighborhoods, which are full of
small parcels with owners who are not rational actors or
cannot be found.
What if a major hotel and entertainment center
developer were ready to build a mixed-use project and,
at the insistence of the city, to provide an equity position
and affordable residences to the lot owners in the area?
Would this be an economic development project? Would
it be prohibited because some lots will be transferred to a
private entity?
If this second category of statutory “reforms” had
been adopted by Congress, would the Gettysburg battlefield still have been saved from a railroad’s extension at
a critical moment? With such reforms, would the state of
Utah have been able to extract needed minerals to further
the public welfare at a key moment in the state’s overall
development?

Conclusion
Before corrective legislation is enacted in New York
there is more that we need to know about the use of
condemnation in redevelopment. How much actual hardship is caused to those whose homes and properties are
condemned? Anecdotal evidence shows that most affected owners settle, agree on prices, and relocate. Some are
unable to find suitable new quarters and suffer economically as a result. A few actually benefit from being transplanted. What corrective measures are needed to prevent
documented hardships? Do we know whether redevelopment projects would be feasible without the availability of
condemnation? Again, there is evidence that many property owners would fail to negotiate for a fair settlement
with redevelopment agencies if they didn’t realize that
the agency could take their property if negotiations fail.
If the absence of the power of condemnation would
mean that most redevelopment projects would not be
feasible, what are the resultant costs to the public? Have
redevelopment projects helped distressed cities to the
benefit of the public? Here the evidence is mixed: New
London’s earlier downtown renewal efforts years ago
were less than impressive, while recent revitalization projects in many regions today seem to be succeeding.
The unique American approach to land development
and urban revitalization is to empower local governments. Seldom are they required to do particular things,
like protect wetlands, limit development to certain areas,
or provide a certain amount of affordable housing. If cit-
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ies want to engage in area-wide redevelopment projects with qualified and eligible private redevelopment
companies, the approach has been to let them do so. The
state legislature will give them that power, but it will not
mandate that they use it.

they struggle to regain their role as powerful centers of
their economic regions.
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